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Book Review 
his book deals with the development of economic thought in the British 
Liberal Party from 1929 to 1964. It covers the 1929 general election in 
which the Liberals, led by David Lloyd George, fought for the proto-
Keynesian expansionary unemployment program to the 1964 general election in 
which the Liberals showed a relative revival under the leadership of Jo Grimond. 
While there has been an accumulation of studies dealing with the political and 
economic thought of the Liberals up to the 1920s, this period has been a relatively 
unexplored field mainly because of the Liberals’ dramatic fall in electoral fortune. 
However, the significance of this book is not merely attributed to its elucidation of 
this under-explored field. Peter Sloman successfully describes how, in this period, 
the modern Liberal economic thinking leading to the present Liberal Democrats’ 
one was formed through the complex interaction between the occasional haphazard 
strategies of various politicians and the various policy proposals of theorists. As a 
result, a fresh and nuanced picture of the development of the Liberal economic 
thought is presented. 
Former studies, including my own in Japanese, have adopted a simple 
dichotomy between laissez-fair classical Liberalism and interventionist social 
Liberalism when describing the development process of Liberalism in the 20th 
century. There have been two different streams of studies, one describing the 
victory of social Liberalism over classical Liberalism in the early stage, and the 
other emphasizing the tenacious survival of the elements of classical Liberalism up 
to the later stage. Either way, the studies depend on that simple dichotomy. But as 
opposed to this dichotomy, Sloman presents a new perspective that describes a 
more complicated, non-linear process of the development of Liberalism, based on 
his own classification of Liberalism into four categories: classical Liberalism, 
Georgism, New Liberalism, and constructive Liberalism. In this classification, 
Georgism is characterized by its focus on land problems and is regarded as closer 
to classical Liberalism. On the other hand, both New Liberalism and constructive 
Liberalism constitute interventionist Liberalism. New Liberalism is characterized 
by its emphasis on ethics, while constructive Liberalism has more pragmatic and 
technocratic tendency. 
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The first phase in this book is the period around 1929 when the celebrated 
Liberal manifestos, Britain’s Industrial Future or the Yellow Book (1928) and We 
Can Conquer Unemployment or the Orange Book (1929) were issued. Criticizing 
scholars who have insisted that Liberals’ support of those ambitious plans was 
merely expedient, Sloman argues that most Liberals sincerely supported the public 
works project and the moderate plannism elucidated in the Yellow Book until they 
faced the severe policy constraints and changing political circumstances in 1931. 
He regards this proto-Keynesian economic policy mainly to be the product of 
constructive Liberalism. Therefore, this period is characterized by the 
predominance of constructive Liberalism. 
The second phase is the 1930s (1931-1939). During this period, the Liberals 
were divided into the Samuelite mainstream, and the National Liberals led by Sir 
John Simon, and the Lloyd George group. Even Michael Freeden, who is a 
precursor in analyzing inter-war Liberalism, regards this period as the ‘decade of 
dormancy’. However, Sloman re-evaluates the creativity of the Liberal economic 
thinking in this period. Under the leadership of Herbert Samuel, the Liberals began 
to dissociate themselves from a plannist position embodied in the Yellow Book and 
consolidated their faith in free trade against the tide to protectionism since 1931. 
Especially since 1933, when the Samuelite Liberals crossed the floor, they severely 
criticized the National Government for both its protectionism and restrictive 
plannism. At the same time, the Labour Party radically moved leftward and 
strengthened their plannist tendency. In this political climate, the Liberals 
recognized a dangerous aspect of planning, because they regarded it as inevitably 
involving socialism and being interconnected with a protectionist policy which 
threatened international peace. An electoral strategy to differentiate the Liberals 
from both the National Government and the Labour also contributed to the 
Liberals’ turning away from plannism. As a result, the classical element within 
Liberalism was restored in the 1930s.  
Sir Archibald Sinclair, who replaced Samuel as the Liberal leader in 1935, 
drove this new tendency further, and established a new synthesis between 
Keynesian demand-management policy and neo-liberal pro-market policy. Sloman 
calls this synthesis the liberal Keynesianism. Although most Liberals did not give 
up their support for the policy of public works in the macroeconomic field, they 
recognized a strong point in the classical or neo-liberal economics represented by 
Lionel Robbins and other LSE scholars in the microeconomic field, and adamantly 
kept their faith in free trade on both economic and ethical grounds. Neo-liberal 
Walter Lippmann’s argument that a microeconomic interventionist policy was a 
threat to liberty and that a macroeconomic demand-management policy was not 
such a threat also contributed to this combination. Elliott Dodds’ idea of 
‘ownership for all’, which aimed to diffuse property ownership through various 
means including tax reforms and profit sharing, was congruent with this new 
synthesis, and was adopted as an official Liberal policy. Sloman regards the 
Keynesian demand-management policy as belonging to the tradition of 
constructive Liberalism, so that this new synthesis was mainly a mixture of 
constructive Liberalism and classical Liberalism or neo-liberalism.  
The third phase is the period of the Second World War (1939-1945). During this 
period, the support for planning within the Liberals was revived because of the 
development of wartime planning. Free trade also lost its significance. William 
Beveridge, who was newly recruited into the Liberal Party, represented this 
stronger interventionist tendency. His book Full Employment in a Free Society 
(1944), which advocated a strong interventionist policy, was accepted by the 
official Liberal Party. This meant that liberal Keynesianism was replaced by a 
more statist interventionist Keynesianism. In other words, constructive Liberalism 
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regained its predominant position. However, Sloman carefully notes that this 
predominance of interventionist Keynesianism was not so firmly grounded because 
of deep-rooted anti-statism among the Liberals. 
The fourth phase is the period during the leadership of Clement Davies (1945-
1956). This period has been known as the lowest point of Liberal political 
influence due to their miserable performance in elections. Naturally, the 
characteristics of Liberalism in this period have generally been a neglected field. 
However, Sloman demonstrates that Liberalism did not completely lose its vitality 
even during this period. Nationalization of industries and price controls driven by 
the Labour Government ignited the controversy within the Liberals over the pros 
and cons of nationalization and planning. Although die-hard libertarians, led by 
Oliver Smedley, were finally defeated, mainstream moderate Liberals withdrew 
their support for strong interventionism. As a result, liberal Keynesianism that was 
predominant in the 1930s regained its hegemonic position. That is, facing the 
reality of nationalization and planning, a more market-friendly approach was 
revived.  
The final fifth phase is the period during the leadership of Jo Grimond (1956-
1964), when the Liberal electoral fortune began to be restored. During this period, 
Britain’s slow economic growth relative to other Western countries began to cause 
a sensation. At the same time, increasing inflationary pressure raised doubt over the 
effectiveness of a demand-management policy through monetary fine-tuning that 
had been adopted by the Conservative Government. Hence, the plannist approach 
to strengthen industrial competitiveness and to tackle inflation was restored within 
the Liberals. While liberal Keynesianism pushed Liberals closer to the 
Conservatives, this new interventionist tendency pulled Liberals closer to the 
Labour. This left-turn taken by the Liberals, as driven by Grimond, would prepare 
them for the later alliance with the Social Democrats, although, after his retirement 
as the Liberal leader, Grimond himself became skeptical of that alliance.  
Thus, Sloman describes the development of the dominant element within 
Liberalism to be zigzag process as it is influenced by social, economic, and 
political circumstances in each period. Though, in reality, the story he tells is far 
more nuanced than is roughly summarized here. His argument firmly builds on 
both politicians’ and theorists’ vast archival records, and persuasively presents a 
fresh perspective on the analysis of economic thought of the Liberals in the 20th 
century. Other than its main scope of the analysis of Liberal economic thought, this 
book also presents some stimulating views on the field of the traditional political 
history. Among those, the argument related to the reason why the second Labour 
Government collapsed in August 1931 is especially interesting. At a critical point, 
Herbert Samuel, who was the acting leader of the Liberals because of Lloyd 
George’s illness, selected Sir Donald Maclean, who held a conservative economic 
opinion, as his partner to discuss with the Labour leaders how to achieve budgetary 
balance. Deferring to the opinion of the Bank of England, both men insisted that an 
unemployment benefit cut would be indispensable, resulting in the Labour cabinet 
falling due to resistance from the cabinet ministers. On the grounds that ‘some 
Liberals – such as the chief whip, Sir Archibald Sinclair – seem to have been 
willing to accept a relatively modest austerity package in order to keep Labour in 
office’ (p.71), Sloman suggests that the fall of the Labour Government might not 
have been inevitable.  
Finally, there are two points to dispute. The first point is about the content of 
constructive Liberalism. This constructive Liberalism is basically tantamount to 
centrist-liberalism named by Michael Freeden. According to Sloman, ‘the ‘‘older, 
capitalist, commercial and more individualist’’ tradition of classical economics was 
refracted through a concern to develop ‘‘institutional and technical solutions’’ to 
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economic problems’, and ‘constructive Liberalism drew momentum from 
developments in mainstream economic theory’ (p.34). In other words, constructive 
Liberalism is a practically revised or transformed version of classical Liberalism. 
The most representative constructive Liberal, John Maynard Keynes, certainly fits 
in this categorization. However, in Sloman’s argument, constructive Liberalism 
was always the most powerful driving force behind strong state intervention and 
plannism, even compared to New Liberalism. That is, within Liberalism, 
constructive Liberalism is the closest to socialism, at least in regards to economic 
policy. So, why and how did moderate pragmatism that had originally 
characterized constructive Liberalism transform into the most radical 
interventionism? This is a question that Sloman leaves unanswered. This puzzle 
might be partly solved by the following interpretation. On the one hand, pragmatic 
theorists and technocrats did not adhere to economic orthodoxy and resorted to 
radical measures during emergencies such as mass unemployment and the Great 
War. On the other hand, many left-leaning Liberals, who did not necessarily fit in 
the category of constructive Liberals, supported these constructive measures due to 
their anti-capitalism sentiments. The strength of constructive Liberalism was a 
result of this combination between centrists’ pragmatism and left-wingers’ anti-
capitalism.  
The second point is about how to position the neo-liberal influence on British 
Liberalism. Sloman emphasizes Lippmann’s influence on the Liberal economic 
thinking in the 1930s. Certainly, as Ben Jackson has demonstrated, neo-liberals 
including Friedrich Hayek were far more moderate in the early stage than they are 
known at present. However, it should be noted that from the early stage, there was 
already a critical difference between Lippmann’s neo-liberalism and Hayek’s 
version that would become mainstream, although Lippmann and Hayek personally 
maintained a good relationship until the 1940s. Under the tradition of 
progressivism, Lippmann’s main enemy was corporate monopolies and holding 
companies, so he fiercely criticized NIRA under the New Deal on the ground that 
the collusion between the federal government and corporations would destroy price 
mechanisms and in so doing threaten liberty. However, for Hayek, the greatest 
threat to normal price mechanisms was trade unions as well as state intervention. 
For him, the power of rising corporations was not problematic in itself, as long as it 
was not promoted by state intervention. He also did not share Lippmann’s positive 
support for the Keynesian demand-management policy. Therefore, it seems that 
Hayek’s more mainstream neo-liberalism did not have much influence on the 
mainstream British Liberalism.  
These are not necessarily arguments against Sloman’s main thesis, and would 
not diminish the great value of this book. It is hoped that this excellent book will 
have a broad readership. 
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